How does PASETO structurally prevent the 'alg:none' style of attack?
PASETO tokens declare a version and purpose (like 'v4.local' or 'v4.public') that map to one fixed, predetermined cryptographic recipe — there's no algorithm field to manipulate, because there's no algorithm choice exposed to the token at all. A 'v4.public' token is always verified with the same fixed asymmetric signing scheme; there's no code path where an attacker can supply a different, weaker algorithm for the verifier to honor.
Answered in
JWT's Real Problem Was Never the Idea, It Was the Choices It AllowsJWT lets you choose 'none' as a signing algorithm. PASETO doesn't let you choose at all — versioned, fixed cipher suites instead of a menu of footguns.
Read the full analysisOther questions this article answers
- What's the actual security flaw people mean when they say JWT is risky?
- What's the difference between PASETO's 'local' and 'public' token types?
- If JWT's flaws are implementation choices, why not just implement JWT carefully instead of switching to PASETO?
- Does switching from JWT to PASETO fix authentication vulnerabilities unrelated to the token format itself?
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