What's the actual security flaw people mean when they say JWT is risky?
JWT is a container format that supports many possible signing algorithms — including 'none', meaning no signature verification at all — and leaves the choice of algorithm to the implementer, decoded from a header the token itself carries. Historical vulnerabilities exploited this flexibility: forging a token with alg set to 'none', or tricking a server into verifying an RS256-signed token's signature using its own public key as if it were an HS256 secret. The JWT specification isn't broken; the amount of implementation choice it leaves open is what caused real vulnerabilities.
Answered in
JWT's Real Problem Was Never the Idea, It Was the Choices It AllowsJWT lets you choose 'none' as a signing algorithm. PASETO doesn't let you choose at all — versioned, fixed cipher suites instead of a menu of footguns.
Read the full analysisOther questions this article answers
- How does PASETO structurally prevent the 'alg:none' style of attack?
- What's the difference between PASETO's 'local' and 'public' token types?
- If JWT's flaws are implementation choices, why not just implement JWT carefully instead of switching to PASETO?
- Does switching from JWT to PASETO fix authentication vulnerabilities unrelated to the token format itself?
More development best practices questions
- How many repositories can be scanned at once?
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- What should teams do when a Copilot model is retired?
- Does changing the model guarantee identical output?
- How does PASETO structurally prevent the 'alg:none' style of attack?
- What's the difference between PASETO's 'local' and 'public' token types?
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